Less than 15 minutes after receiving the order to attack, six U.S. Trident submarines at sea could loft roughly 1,000 warheads, and several Russian ballisticmissile submarines could dispatch between 300 and 400. In sum, the two nuclear superpowers remain ready to fire a total of inore than 5,000 nuclear weapons at each other within half an hour. Why do two countries at peace retain such aggressive postures, ones that perpetuate the danger of a mistaken or unauthorized launch? Because military planners on both sides remain fixated on the remote specter of a deliberate nuclear surprise attack from their former adversary. They assume that such a "first strike" would be alined against their own strategic nuclear weapons and the command centers that direct them. To deter such an assault, each country strives to ensure that it could respond with a forceful counterattack against the full spectrum 'of military targets on its opponent's territory, including all nuclear weapons installations. This requirement saddles military planners with a task virtually identical in scope to mounting a first strike: they must be able to guarantee the rapid destruction of thousands of targets spread across a distant continent. In order to meet this demand, both the U.S. and Russia rely on a launch-on-warning strategy-that is, each side is poised to release a massive retaliatory missile salvo after detecting an enemy niissile attack but before the incoming warheads arrive (which alight take just 15 minutes if they were fired from submarines nearby). Although it has thousands of warheads securely deployed at sea, the U.S. adheres to this quick-draw stance because of the vulnerability of its missile silos and command apparatus, including its political and military leadership in Washington, D.C. Russian officials perceive an even greater need to launch their missiles on warning. The General Staff evidently fears that if its nuclear missiles are not launched immediately, tticii only tens of them would be able to respond after absorbing a systematic U.S. attack. Russian command posts and missile silos are as vulnerable as those of the U.S. to a massive assault. Russia's current inability to deploy many of its most survivable forces submarines at sea and mobile land-based rockets-amplifies this worry.
A lack of resources and qualified personnel has forced the Russian navy to cut back operations considerably. At present, the Russian navy typically keeps only two of its 26 ballistic missile submarines at sea on combat patrol at any one time. Similar constraints prevent Russia from hiding more than one or two regiments of its truck-mounted mobile missiles by dispersing them in the field. The remaining 40 or so regiments, each controlling nine single-warhead missiles, keep their trucks parked in garages. These missiles are more exposed to attack than those housed in underground silos. Russia also has 36 1O-warhead nuclear missiles carried on railway cars, which were designed to be hidden along Russia's vast rail network. But these railcars remain confined to fixed garrisons in keeping with a decision made by President Gorbachev in 1991. These vulnerabilities have led Russia to ready some of its submarines in port and mobile missiles in garages to launch on warning, along with the missiles in silos. The time available for deciding to launch these weapons is shortened by the presence of American, British and French submarines cruising in the North Atlantic, only about 2,000 miles (3,200 kilometers) from Moscow. This proximity means that the nuclear-release procedures in Russia require a response time of less than 15 minutes: a few minutes for detecting an attack, another few minutes for top-level decision making and a few minutes for disseminating the launch order. Russian leaders and missile controllers are geared to work with in this brief time frame and to practice regularly with drills. U.S. nuclear forces operate with a similarly short fuse. It is obvious that the rushed nature of his process, from warning to decision on action, risks causing a catastrophic mistake. 'The danger is complicated by the erosion of Russia's ability to distinguish reliably between natural phenomena or peaceful ventures into space and a true missile attack.
Only one third of its modern early-warning radars are working at all, and at least two of the nine slots in its constellation of missile warning satellites are empty. The dangers stemming from this decline in Russia's technical capabilities are offset, to some extent, by the relaxation of tensions that has come with the end of the cold war. Given the milder political climate, decision makers on both sides should be more inclined to question the validity of any reports they receive of an impending missile attack. Nevertheless, the coupling of two arsenals geared for rapid response carries the inherent danger of producing a mistaken launch and an escalating volley of missiles in return. The possibility an apocalyptic accident cannot be ruled out even under normal conditions. And if the control of Russian nuclear weapons were to be stressed by an internal or international political crisis, the danger could suddenly become much more acute. During the cold war, such risks were subordinafed to the overriding requirement to deter an enemy believed to be willing to launch a nuclear attack. This rationalization is no longer defensible, if ever it was.
Today, when both countries seek normal economic relations and cooperative security arrangements, perpetuating the readiness to launch nuclear weapons on the mere warning of an attack constitutes reckless behavior. Yet this thinking is so entrenched that it will yield only to steady pressure from the public on political leaders, especially presidents-to replace it with a safer policy.
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5,000 nuclear missles could be launched by the US and Soviet subs in half hour.
This is nuts. That is not even counting all the one we have in silos all around the midwest.
Its nothing but insane to have that many nukes at the fawking ready.
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